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The world’s justice systems are under stress.  Politi-
cal commitments to democratization and human rights 
protection, private economic transactions, counter-
terrorism, and globalization impose new burdens on 
justice institutions for more impartial and transpar-
ent conflict resolution.  The intrinsic need of a mod-
ern state to be both strong and self-limiting requires a 
strong and independent judiciary to realize these rule-
of-law objectives.   
Courts are arguably the least dangerous, but most ne-
glected, institutions to deal with these increasing needs 
for effective conflict resolution capacity.  The higher 
stakes and  pressures on judicial  decision making have 
not yet motivated  proportionate investment in justice 
institutions, their institutional independence, transpar-
ent procedures, or requisite financial and human re-
sources.  Courts remain vulnerable to outside influence. 
Political interference, corruption, delay, prolonged pre-
trial detention, and the use of physical coercion appear 
to be on the rise, further undermining widely shared 
rule-of-law goals.
Political processes frequently are dominated by a 
society’s most powerful factions.  Social groups may be 
divided historically and culturally along the fault lines 
of conflict with the effect of complicating meaningful 
political reforms.  Institutional neglect also is an effect 
and compounding cause of sustained, armed conflict 
where people are fighting over longstanding enmities, 
overlapping claims, contested rights of worship, repara-
tion or punishment for serious offenses, and disputed 
ownership and allocation of natural resources. 
Court systems often belong (or are seen as beholden) 
to one group over another, or they have too few resourc-
es to perform effectively (and must subsist on supple-
mental income from corruption), or they must rely on 
other branches of government for their budgets and en-
forcement of their decisions.  Furthermore, zero-sum 
judicial decisions (win-lose, stay-leave, and get-pay) 
may be too partial or too absolute to provide a durable 
accommodation of seemingly irreconcilable and mutu-
ally exclusive claims.
Private arbitration (and the corresponding need for 
judicial enforcement of arbitral awards) provides an im-
perfect answer to the demands of cross-border conflict 
resolution, as parties still rely on national courts for 
confirmation and enforcement of arbitral awards.  Ar-
bitration is also equally, if not more, vulnerable to the 
constraints affecting courts.  Mediation or conciliation 
may be unavailable, underdeveloped, or unacceptable 
as an option for resolving conflicts, particularly violent 
conflicts. Criminal justice institutions, too, are often 
insufficiently financed, depend too heavily on confes-
sions, permit protracted and unjustified pre-trial deten-
tions, and provide limited human rights protection in 
the absence of available defense counsel or open, public 
proceedings.   To realize our deepest commitments to 
justice, these gaps must be filled.
The ability to do so, however, is frustrated by a limited 
capacity to devise and implement effective institutional 
reforms.  Many expensive global justice reform projects 
administered by international or national institutions 
or NGOs fall short, and a candid self-assessment pro-
vide three starting points for improving performance.
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First, foreign experts often lack sufficient apprecia-
tion of local needs and constraints.  The practical oper-
ation of legal systems in their embedded webs of social, 
economic, cultural, and political realities is complex. 
Understanding the incentives and disincentives for ef-
fective conflict resolution is difficult, even with pro-
longed study.  Any foreign advice carries with it a high 
probability of inapplicability, regardless of the degree 
of expertise involved.  Therefore, foreign advisers must 
immerse themselves in humble and open-minded study 
of local justice systems (and the conditions in which 
they operate) before trying to assist.
Second, recommended reforms too often are based 
on generic, untested assumptions that a conventionally 
accepted formula for reform will generate the desired 
outcome once implemented.  Foreign advisers often as-
sume they have correct answers to fundamental ques-
tions, such as:  Does judicial self-regulation ensure pro-
tection from political interference?  Does an increase 
in judicial salaries eliminate corruption?  Does alterna-
tive dispute resolution reduce court delay?  Does the 
provision of defense counsel ensure protection of basic 
human rights in criminal proceedings?  Without real-
ity testing whether generic assumptions overcome lo-
cal constraints, and without applying accurate metrics 
to assess outcomes, reform efforts are likely to disap-
point.    
Third, outsiders often bear little accountability for 
the consequences of their advice in the context of re-
form.  Beyond weak outcome assessment tools, deci-
sion-making authority must be politically accountable 
to the reforming society.  Thus, in addition to develop-
ing greater accountability for projected outcomes, in-
ternational or foreign advisers must work jointly with 
local leaders and experts who will bear the burden of 
any particular disappointments.
In other words, the overwhelming nature of justice 
reform challenges is compounded by a second capac-
ity gap—the capacity to gather enough local knowledge, 
challenge prevailing theories, evaluate outcomes, and 
work jointly with sufficient humility toward decision-
makers within the reforming society.  Closure of this 
second gap (as key to the first) will require a new brand 
of global civic engagement, beyond the mere exchange 
of information, cross-national visits, uncritical recita-
tion of theory, false equivalence of supply-side funding 
with demand-side success, or the suspension of compet-
ing values.  Engagement in global justice reform must 
entail a process of intense social interaction between 
foreign and domestic legal communities, experts and 
non-experts, proponents and opponents, top officials 
and lower-level actors, leaders and followers. This in-
teraction seeks to gain insight into the nature of the 
problems, the value of the specific tools, and the ap-
plicability of those tools in different combinations to 
identified problems.  Engagement therefore requires an 
intellectual investment in getting familiar with the legal 
system and the society in which it functions, thinking 
deeply about the embedded comparative theories in al-
ternative reform proposals, transparently deliberating 
over value choices that underlie support or rejection of 
a specific technique or proposal, and creating more so-
phisticated tools of programmatic outcome evaluation.
Reformers had better intensify their efforts to close 
the second gap before the world’s justice systems have a 
chance of closing the first.
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